1	<u>CLA</u>	AIMS
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3	WH	IAT IS CLAIMED IS:
4		•
5	1.	A machine-executable method for executing a trusted command
6		issued by a user, said method comprising the steps of:
7		
8		(a) parsing the trusted command in an untrusted computing
9		environment to generate a parsed command;
10		
11 4		(b) submitting the parsed command to a trusted computing
12		environment; and
3		
14		(c) executing the parsed command in the trusted computing
15		environment.
15 H		
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18		
19	2.	A method including the steps of claim 1 and additionally including
20		the steps, executed after step (b) of claim 1, of:
21		
22		(1) in the trusted environment, displaying a representation of
23		the parsed command to the user;
24	•	

1		(2)	receiving a signal from the user signifying whether the
2			displayed representation accurately represents the user's
3		٠	intentions;
4			
5		(3)	if the signal signifies that the displayed representation does
6			not accurately represent the user's intentions, then
7			preventing the performance of step (c) of claim 1.
8			
9			
10			
11	3.	The	method of claim 2 wherein the representation of the parsed
12		comn	nand is displayed, and the signal from the user is received,
'3		throu	gh a trusted path.
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15			
16			
17	4.	The	method of claim 1 wherein the trusted computing
18		envir	onment comprises a security kernel.
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22	5.	The	method of claim 1 wherein the untrusted computing
23	•	envir	onment comprises a general operating system.
24	•		

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3	6. A m	ethod for executing in a computing system a trusted command
4	issue	ed by a user, said method comprising the steps of:
5		
6	(a)	receiving user identification data from the user via a
7		trusted path,
8		
9	(b)	receiving the trusted command from the user via an
10		untrusted path;
11	Tr. Garage	
12	(c)	parsing the trusted command in an untrusted computing
3	# (c)]]	environment to generate a parsed command;
14		\mathcal{A}
15	(d)	submitting the parsed command to a trusted computing
16		environment;
17		
18	(e)	in the trusted computing environment, performing a security
. 19		check on the parsed command and user identification data;
20		and
21		
22	(f)	in the trusted computing environment, executing the trusted
23	•	command.
24		
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3	7.	The method	of claim 6, wherein the security check enforces an
4		Orange Boo	k security criterion.
5			
6			
7			
8	8.	A method is	ncluding the steps of claim 6 and additionally including
9		the steps, ex	secuted after step (d) and before step (f) of claim 6,
10		of:	
11			
12 =		(1)	in the trusted environment, displaying a
'3 [] 14.			representation of the parsed command to the user;
10 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12		(2)	receiving a signal from the user signifying whether
16			the displayed representation accurately represents the
17			trusted command; and
18			
19		(3)	if the signal signifies that the displayed
20			representation does not accurately represent the
21			trusted command, then preventing the performance
22	٠		of step (f) of claim 6.
23	•		
24			

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2	9.	A method including the steps of claim 6 and additionally including
3		the steps, executed after step (d) and before step (f) of claim 6,
4		of:
5		
6		(1) in the trusted environment, displaying a
7		representation of the parsed command to a second
8		user;
9		
10		(2) receiving a signal from the second user signifying
11		whether the displayed representation accurately
12		represents a legitimate command; and
3 🗐		χ_{Λ}^{3}
14		(3) if the signal signifies that the displayed
15		representation does not accurately represent a
16		legitimate command, then preventing the
17		performance of step (f) of claim 6.
18		
19		
20		
21	10.	A method for ensuring the existence of a trusted path in a
22		computing system comprising the steps of:
23	•	·

1		(a) in a trusted computing environment, upon login by a user,
2		assigning a process identifier to the user in the trusted
3		computing environment;
4		
5		(b) storing the assigned process identifier in trusted memory;
6		
7		(c) establishing a trusted path;
8		
9		(d) in the trusted path displaying the process identifier to the
10		user; and
11		
12		(e) upon a subsequent entry into the trusted path, displaying
12 mm mm arg		the process identifier to the user.
14		
15		
16		
17	11.	The method of claim 10 wherein the process identifier is a
18		randomly or pseudo-randomly generated group of alphanumeric
19		characters.
20		
21		
22		
23	12.	The method of claim 11 wherein the process identifier is
24	•	pronounceable.

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4	13.	An automatic data processing machine programmed to execute the
5		method of any one of claims 1 to 12.
6		
7		
8		
9	14.	An automatic data processing machine comprising means for
10 mm 1 m		performing the method steps of any one of claims 1 to 12.
14	15.	A program storage device readable by a machine and tangibly
1 5 1		embodying a representation of a program of instructions adaptable
16.		to be executed by said machine to perform the method of any
17		one of claims 1 to 12.
18		
19		
20		

1	16.	Apparatus for executing a trusted command that is issued by a
2		user and that is parsed by untrusted parsing means to generate a
3		parsed command, comprising:
4		
5		(a) trusted means for receiving the parsed command; and
6		
7		(b) trusted means for executing the parsed command.
8		
9		
10=		
11	17.	Apparatus for controlling the execution by a machine of a trusted
12		command that is issued by a user and that is parsed by untrusted
10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1		parsing means to generate a parsed command, comprising:
14.		
15		(a) trusted-program storage means, readable by the machine,
16		for causing the machine to receive the parsed command
17		from the untrusted parsing means, and
18		
19		(b) trusted-program storage means, readable by the machine,
20		for causing the machine to execute the parsed command.
21		
22		
23	•	•

- 18. Apparatus for controlling the execution by a machine of a trusted command that is issued by a user with user identification data and that is parsed by untrusted parsing means to generate a parsed command, comprising:
 - (a) trusted program storage means, readable by the machine, for causing the machine to receive the user identification data from the user;
 - (b) trusted program storage means, readable by the machine, for causing the machine to receive the parsed command from the untrusted parsing means;
 - (c) trusted program storage means, readable by the machine, for causing the machine to perform a security check on the parsed command and a security check on the user identification data; and
 - (d) trusted program storage means, readable by the machine, for causing the machine to execute the trusted command.

1	19.	Appa	ratus as in claim 18 and additionally comprising:
2			
3		(1)	trusted program storage means, readable by the machine,
4			for causing the machine to display a representation of the
5			parsed command to the user;
6			
7		(2)	trusted program storage means, readable by the machine,
8			for causing the machine to receive a signal from the user
9			signifying whether the displayed representation accurately
10			represents the trusted command; and
1 1. :			
10 12 12 13 15 15 16 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18		(3)	trusted program storage means, readable by the machine,
133			for preventing the machine from executing the trusted
145			command if the signal signifies that the parsed command
15.			does not accurately represent the trusted command.
16			\mathcal{A}^{\prime}
17	20.	Appa	ratus as in claim 18 and additionally comprising:
18			
19		(1)	trusted program storage means readable by the machine,
20			for causing the machine to display a representation of the
21			parsed command to a second user;
22			
23	•	(2)	trusted program storage means, readable by the machine,
24	•		for causing the machine to receive a signal from the second

user signifying whether the displayed representation accurately represents a legitimate command; and

(3) trusted program storage means, readable by the machine, for preventing the machine from executing the trusted command if the signal signifies that the parsed command does not accurately represent a legitimate command.

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